Repayment in microfinance: The role of financial literacy and caste Rashmi Barua, Renuka Sane

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Summary of findings

The authors document two key benefits of financial literacy

- Leads to a decline in the number of days taken to make loan repayments
- Helps borrowers in homogeneous groups of reserved castes overcome their initial disadvantage of low financial literacy

- Banerjee et al. (2010) suggest that the real benefit of bringing poor households into formal or semi-formal financial sector via microfinance might be limited
 - Would additional interventions such as *targetted financial education programs* help?

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 - Would additional interventions such as *targetted financial education programs* help?
- There is a paucity of randomized evaluation of financial literacy programs
 - Cole et al. (2010) find no effect of an education program designed to promote savings behaviour
 - Carpena et al. (2012) reject the hypothesis that financial education permits individuals to minimize interest expense by choosing from a pool of loans

- Results from non-randomized experiments have been mixed
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 - Bernheim et al. (2003) find that high school financial education leads to higher savings rate
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- Agarwal et al. (2009) and Agarwal et al. (2010) examine the *relative* efficacy of a mandatory counseling program *and* a long-term voluntary participation program for prospective homebuyers
 - They find the latter approach to be more effective; they document lower delinquency rates among program graduates

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 - The programs might be effective, but participants might suffer from cognitive biases (non-response to generalized information, lack of self-control, procrastination etc)
 - The programs might be effective, but its impact on financial decision making might be inherently difficult to measure

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- The current paper assesses the impact of mandatory short-term financial programs on loan repayment behaviour
 - The authors exploit variation in timing of financial literacy program across branches
- Big picture: Why is a higher repayment rate beneficial?
 - ... " high repayment rates can reduce the cost of credit and allow MFIs to lower the interest rates, thereby enabling greater access to finance"

- The authors use multiple measures of loan repayment performance
 - Days late in each of six installments
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 - Days late in each of six installments
 - The total number of days late over six installments
 - The total number of months of delayed repayment
- The focus on the first six installments is due to data constraints
 - The program was administered in 2012; by Feb 2014 (the last period for which the authors have data), most loans would have had completed six months of tenure *post* the program

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- Suggestions:
 - Define a 60 days-past-due (DPD) measure; what % of loans went 60 DPD in the first six installments?
 - Repeat the analysis with loans of maturity 12 months, but using a 60 DPD or 90 DPD as a measure of performance

• In most cases, *days late in each installment* is negative; this suggests that borrowers are actually paying ahead of time.

		Training		
	Full sample	Yes	No	
N	17896	10901	6995	
Days late installment #1	-0.06	-0.21	0.17	
	(3.07)	(2.13)	(4.13)	
Days late installment #2	-0.04	-0.09	0.03	
	(3.36)	(2.98)	(3.88)	
Days late installment #3	-0.08	-0.10	-0.05	
	(5.09)	(4.92)	(5.34)	
Days late installment #4	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	
	(6.27)	(5.89)	(6.82)	
Days late installment #5	-0.28	-0.32	-0.21	
	(6.43)	(5.33)	(7.85)	
Days late installment #6	-0.29	-0.37	-0.18	
	(8.23)	(7.51)	(9.24)	
Total Days Late	-0.78	-1.10	-0.27	
	(19.69)	(16.69)	(23.61)	
Number of months late	0.11	0.06	0.18	
	(0.40)	(0.26)	(0.54)	

• It wasn't evident from the paper, but does Swadhaar have a policy of giving grace periods? If yes, are the above results inclusive of such grace periods?

• Across all measures of loan repayment, financial literacy yields improvements that are statistically significant

able 5 Results: Differe	ence-m-am	erence				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth
	Installment	Installment	Installment	Installment	Installment	Installment
Financial Literacy	-0.256*	-0.303*	-0.475**	-0.617**	-0.792***	-1.101***
	(0.143)	(0.163)	(0.235)	(0.301)	(0.302)	(0.371)
Disbursed Amount	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000***	$\begin{array}{cccc} -0.792^{***} & -1.101^{**} \\ (0.302) & (0.371) \\ -0.000 & -0.000^* \\ (0.000) & (0.000) \\ 0.114 & 0.169 \\ (0.689) & (0.109) \\ 0.067 & 0.291^* \\ (0.144) & (0.177) \\ 0.017 & 0.099^* \\ (0.047) & (0.058) \\ -0.000 & -0.001 \\ (0.001) & (0.001) \\ 0.052 & 0.098 \\ (0.100) & (0.000) \\ -0.066 & -0.135 \\ (0.090) & (0.111) \\ 0.046 & 0.062 \\ (0.106) & (0.130) \\ 0.032 & 0.018 \end{array}$	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Loan Series	-0.164^{***}	-0.098**	0.061	0.220**	0.114	0.169
	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.109)
Married	-0.058	0.045	0.211*	0.101	0.067	0.291*
	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.112)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.177)
Age of Client	0.040*	-0.035	0.005	0.071	0.017	0.099*
-	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.058)
Age Squared	-0.001*	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
No Education	0.046	0.020	0.054	0.213**	0.052	0.098
	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.128)
Monthly Income	0.000**	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Number of Earning Members	-0.051	-0.077	-0.036	0.003	-0.066	-0.135
0	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.111)
Reserved Caste	0.112*	-0.134**	0.087	0.154	0.046	0.062
	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.130)
Number of Dependents	-0.010	-0.016	-0.061**	-0.045	0.032	0.018
*	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.046)
Branch Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16272	16272	16272	16272	16272	16272
R-Squared	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01
.						

* Significant at the 10%; ** at the 5%; *** at 1% levels

Regressions control for the duration of the loan i.e. 12 months or 24 months

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 - How do we attribute this to financial literacy?

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- How do we juxtapose these two results? The authors might want to elaborate more on this
- Given that these *mandatory* programs were for only 30 minutes, it might be interesting to examine if basic and/or financial literacy of family members has an impact on the borrower's repayment behaviour

Extended regression models

• The authors extend the base models to examine the impact of social ties and group homogeneity on repayment

Table 8 Results:	: Group Homogeneity			
		(1) Total Days Late	(2) Number of Months Late	
	Financial Literacy	-3.117***	0.070***	
		(1.002)	(0.022)	
	All Reserved*Financial Literacy	0.994	-0.033*	
		(0.808)	(0.017)	
	All Reserved Caste	-0.887	0.029**	
		(0.627)	(0.014)	
	All General*Financial Literacy	-1.409^{**}	-0.022	
		(0.695)	(0.015)	
	All General Caste	-0.591	-0.002	
		(0.510)	(0.011)	
	Observations	16264	16264	
	* Significant at the 10%; ** at the Regressions control for the durati months or 24 months and demogr	te 5%; *** at 1 ion of the loan raphic variable	% levels i.e. 12 s	

• While the authors make some interesting inferences, lack of consistency in results across loan performance measures is a source of concern

Other comments

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 - To be fair, the authors do acknowledge this in the conclusion.
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 - Field and Pande (2008) find that flexibility in repayment (weekly vs monthly) has no significant effect on client delinquency or default
 - Field et al. (2012) find that flexibility in repayment reduces financial stress
 - Field et al. (2014) find that allowing a grace period in repayment involves both costs and benefits

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 - This is a valuable addition to the emerging literature on the benefits of such intervention programs
- The authors validate their primary results using a comprehensive battery of robustness tests
- Interesting paper and definitely recommend reading it